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Abstract
Digital labour is widely depicted as a carrier of
economic opportunities for poor and marginalised
individuals. Such an orthodoxy is however questioned
from research pointing at the structural vulnerabilities
of digital work, vulnerabilities that the COVID-19 crisis
has highlighted on a global scale. The central
contribution of this paper is that subalternity theory
offers the intellectual tools to understand the structural
vulnerability of digital platform workers, setting the
ground for studying emerging forms of collective
resistance among them. Drawing on a data repository
of web sources collected through the first four months
of the COVID-19 crisis, it reveals the establishment of a
mainstream discourse from platform representatives,
the presence of forms of systematic devoicing among
workers, and the emergence of a paternalistic attitude
enacted by the platforms in continuity with the pre-crisis
situation. Implications are drawn for the literature on
digital labour, and for the study of emerging solidarity
networks among workers subjected to subalternity.

1. Introduction
The diffusion of digital labour, worldwide and
especially across the Global South, is underpinned by an
orthodoxy depicting digital work as a carrier of
opportunities for marginalised individuals. Such a view
assumes that digital platforms present opportunities on
physical (e.g. food delivery, ride-hailing apps) and
digital tasks (on platforms such as UpWork, Freelancer
or Amazon Mechanical Turk), which offer flexibility to
the worker and bypass the geographical and political
barriers imposed by labour markets. Such an orthodoxy
is subject to critique, especially highlighting the nature
of digital labour as precarious and vulnerable [4, 16] and
a structural lack of accountability of digital platforms to
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their workers [18, 44]. In this light, a recent literature
has highlighted forms of resistance enacted by digital
workers across the globe, ranging from organised
protest [18, 10, 4] to intra-familial and societal worker
solidarity networks [33].
Against this backdrop, the current COVID-19 crisis
has highlighted the severity of the vulnerabilities to
which digital platform workers are exposed. Just a few
weeks into the emergency, reports of mistreating and
exploitation in the gig economy started emerging,
detailing instances of lacking workers’ protection and
crucially, the refusal of digital labour platforms to
account for their workers’ conditions. Food delivery
workers [23]; ride-hailing app drivers [4], as well as
domestic workers finding their jobs through digital apps
[40] are tied together by the common denominator of
exposure to limited accountability of the platforms
responsible for workers’ protection and fair labour
conditions under the pandemic. In April 2020, the
Fairwork Foundation published a survey of 120
platforms across 23 countries, updated in September
2020 to include 191 platforms in 43 countries,
highlighting the pervasiveness of such issues, as well as
the asymmetries between conditions dictated to workers
and promises for crisis interventions made by platform
representatives on public media spaces [14].
In the light of COVID-19, emerging forms of
resistance are unfolding among digital platform workers
affected by the crisis. Data presented in this paper draw
from a repository of blog posts, news items and
company reports collected in the aftermath of the
COVID-19 outbreak, relating to impacts suffered by gig
workers and measures taken to mitigate these. The
central contribution of this paper is that subalternity
theory, in its seminal formulation by Guha & Spivak
[21], offers the intellectual tools to study the structural
vulnerabilities of digital platform workers, as well as the
mainstream discourse of protection constructed by
platform owners in the light of the crisis. The COVID19 scenario, in which the economic vulnerability of
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workers makes existing forms of oppression more acute
and severe, offers the conditions to study emerging
forms of digital resistance, establishing dialogue
between subalternity theory and the study of solidarity
networks in the datafied society [6].
This paper is structured as follows. First, digital
labour platforms and the discontents of precarity and
vulnerability are introduced, illuminating heightening
effects of COVID-19 on both aspects. Subalternity
theory – with its concepts of mainstream discourse,
devoicing and paternalism – is then introduced as a
conceptual lens to study the vulnerabilities of platform
workers in the COVID-19 situation. Analysis of a data
repository of 68 web sources is then articulated
according to such concepts. The study draws
implications for the literature on digital labour, setting
the ground for studying the emergence of solidarity
networks among platform workers affected by the crisis.

2. Digital Labour Platforms and COVID19
Existing estimates of the size of the digital gig
economy point to 60 million workers registered with
online labour platforms, out of which 6 million currently
active [26]. A substantial share of these workers is
located in the Global South: citing Codagnone [11],
Heeks [26] notes there is an estimated 45 million
registered workers on Western-based online labour
platforms, and uses surveys by Agrawal [2] and
Lehdonvirta [31] to estimate 36 million of these being
from the Global South with a prevalence in India, the
Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Digital work is
rapidly diffusing across African [3] and Latin American
countries [20]. A recent projection says that in China, up
to 400 million people (half the labour force) could be
gig workers by 2036.1
Consisting of a geographically dispersed workforce,
the gig economy is understood through different
taxonomies of the sub-sectors that constitute it. Heeks
[26] divides it into digital (online labour) and physical
gig economy (location-based service delivery), where
online labour refers to intangible work delivered online
and location-based services (such as ride-hailing or food
delivery) are organised digitally, but delivered
physically. Graham and Woodcock [18] further divide
online labour into microtask platforms (such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk) involving short crowdsourced tasks,
and freelance work platforms (such as Upwork or
Freelancer) involving more specific skills and relations
with clients. In a similar fashion, the Fairwork
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Foundation uses the terms gig work and crowdwork for
the physical-digital dichotomy in point.2
As research in Information and Communication
Technology for Development (ICT4D) increasingly
turns to digital platforms as a research object [22, 35,
39] discourse emerged on understanding theoretical
links between digital labour platforms and socioeconomic development [33]. Surveys conducted across
digital workers in the Global South reveal that these
platforms have enabled workers to build earnings and
skills [7], and that “positives outweigh negatives” for
workers who find previously non-existing employment
opportunities in digital work [12, 29, cited in 26]. Such
positives originated a sustained orthodoxy of digital
labour for development, leveraged in reports such as
World Bank [45] and the Rockefeller Foundation [41]
to portray digital work as a force for empowering
marginalised people through sustained earnings.
Counteracting such theories is, however, criticism
on the extent to which such an orthodoxy is a fair
depiction of the effects of digital platforms on workers.
A three-pronged taxonomy of critical objections is
offered by Graham and Woodcock [18]: a first point
pertains to new practices of digital work, such as tagging
or moderating commercial content, which can involve
looking at traumatic content for extended periods of
time [18]. Other forms of emotional strain are suffered
by workers, such as ride-hailing app drivers, exposed to
disrespectful behaviour by users [15] and what is worse,
to rating systems that empower users at the workers’
expense [26]. Subjection to unfair bad ratings, which
can result in deactivation and cannot normally be easily
challenged [15], crystallises workers’ disempowerment,
adding to the risks intrinsic in their daily jobs [36].
A second issue results from the way digital labour
platforms transform existing practices [18].
Commodified labour [27] results into increased
casualisation generated, in turn, by outsourcing
previously established work practices. Consequential to
the transition to platforms is, in particular, the reclassification of workers from employees to freelancers
– a move that, under multiple national legal frameworks
[16], deprives the worker of employee protection
systems that would otherwise be mandated. Issues
resulting from such a transition notably include absence
of holiday pay, health insurance or sick leave, retirement
benefits, injury compensation and in some cases, even
the guarantee of a minimum wage [8].
Thirdly, the geographical dispersion of workers –
combined with the non-cooperative nature of many
tasks in digital work – often induces platform workers
to compete rather than collaborate [18]. Competing for
2
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the same jobs, facing risk of deactivation in case of low
ratings or failure to complete a sufficient number of
tasks, hampers the construction of solidarity networks
among digital workers, increasing the difficulty of
establishing formal and informal means to unionisation
[33]. Information asymmetries [26] between workers
and platform owners contribute to the difficulty of
building such networks, with workers’ classification as
“freelancers” acting as a pretext for platforms to decline
responsibilities [16]. As a result, in case of complaints,
workers may find it hard to even be sure of “whom to
complain to” in the first place [18].
This synopsis of problems reveals how, in response
to an orthodoxy that views digital work as a form of
empowerment of the marginalised through sustained
earnings, a double structural problem emerges. A first
component lies in the power asymmetries affecting
workers, resulting in precarity [3] manifested through
disempowering classifications (as “freelancers” rather
than “employees”) and rating systems that empower the
customer to decide on workers’ destiny, by ratings
whose fairness is normally not overseen. A second
component stems from informational asymmetry,
resulting in workers not being aware of key mechanisms
for seeking protection and grievance redressal. This
contributes to workers’ vulnerability, as informational
gaps prevent any form of bargaining or worker
negotiation from happening in equal terms [3].
Against this backdrop, with the global crisis initiated
by the COVID-19 outbreak, such aspects of precarity
and vulnerability have acquired new visibility,
proliferating across narratives from digital workers
worldwide. In the recent aftermath of the declaration of
the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic by the World
Health Organisation in March 2020, ethnographic
accounts from gig workers revealed their frontline role
in the pandemic, taking care of a plethora of services –
from food delivery to private transport – that national
governments encourage people to use to enforce social
distancing [4, 20, 23]. Platform workers are key workers
under all aspects: as the Fairwork Foundation report
[14] observes, their work substitutes key services,
however exposing workers to the risk of contracting the
COVID-19 infection by daily work practices. This
conundrum, placing gig workers in a key position and
yet a condition of perpetuated risk, illustrates the
criticality of the workers’ situation.
Such risk can be framed in terms of the issues of
precarity and vulnerability illustrated above. In terms of
precarity, numerous reports illustrate the difficulty of
the economic condition in which workers are induced.
With the widespread suspension of services from
platforms deemed as “non-essential”, many workers
such as domestic cleaners [40] or workers of the beauty
industry [46] have found themselves without secure

incomes, whereas active workers in lockdown situations
have lost an average of two-thirds of their income [14].
Vulnerability emerges in the same picture: ethnographic
accounts reveal the physical proximity to which food
delivery workers are forced in queues for collection
[23], and the need of ride-hailing workers to keep
working during the outbreaks to offset fixed costs of
their work [20]. Such ethnographies concur with
surveys [25] in stating the lack of accountability of
platforms for the provision of essential protection, such
as masks or hand sanitisers, which workers often have
to supply by themselves, with few exceptions reported
[14].
Drawn together, these accounts narrate the
enhancement of fragility in conditions endured by
digital platform workers during COVID-19. It has been
argued [25] that the crisis has illuminated aspects of
fragility that were already present, such as the
conditions of structural precarity and vulnerability
illustrated above. While the crisis results in greater
visibility of such problems, few attempts have been
made to theoretically conceptualise the roots of such
issues for digital workers in light of the crisis. In this
scenario, subalternity theory offers important concepts
for theorisation.

3. Digital Labour: A Subalternity Theory
Lens
In recent studies of ICT4D, subaltern visions have
introduced critical theorisations in a field dominated by
interpretive approaches. Lin et al. [32] observe that the
link between macro socio-political context and local
innovation, captured by critical approaches, sheds light
on aspects of oppression and alienation that may not be
caught by interpretive analyses. Critical research is
characterised by coexistence of theorisation and
transformation of an oppressive status quo [38], and
seeks to illuminate alienating conditions with a view to
tackle the root causes of statuses of social domination.
Its transformational intent, as well as its focus on macro
socio-political dynamics, marks its difference from
positivist and interpretive research paradigms.
While established work in the information systems
(IS) field depicts critical theory as hegemonised by the
three Western streams led by Bourdieu, Foucault and
Habermas [37], indigenous schools of thought such as
subaltern studies have found limited recognition in IS so
far. Originating from a South Asian scholars’ collective
[21], the subaltern studies school is underpinned by its
focus on a devoiced and objectified entity, indeed
referred to as the subaltern [43], whose condition is
dictated by exclusion from the hegemonic structure of
society [19]. Impinging on South Asian experiences of
postcolonialism, subaltern scholars draw on Gramscian
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theory to carve a space for narratives of subalternity in
postcolonialism, using the South Asian experience to
construct a conceptual apparatus to narrate
marginalisation of individuals and communities.
While firmly originating in and for South Asia, the
focus of subaltern studies captures popular politics
affecting “most of the world” [9] as a result of
postcolonial practices. Drawing on Gramsci’s [19]
notion of hegemony as a process through which ruling
classes leverage cultural institutions to maintain their
power, the subaltern school of thought conceives
hegemonic discourse by the dominant classes as the
mainstream narrative acknowledged in society [32].
Such a dominant discourse predominates on narratives
by those left at the margins of society, whose
subalternity results in devoicing [43]. Subordination
leaves the subaltern confined to particular ways of
encountering, or “seeing”, the mainstream: such
encounters take place through a host of technologies of
rule [42], which crystallise the position of the
mainstream as dominant and that of the subaltern as
recipients of mainstream narratives. Paradigmatic of
technologies of rule is the Indian census, which
inscribes individuals into colonially-established
categories without giving them a say on the matter, and
hence leaving them devoiced [13].
Devoicing and marginalising as these can be,
encounters with the subaltern are far from being
depicted by the mainstream as a means of subjugation.
Following Gramsci’s [19] theorisation of paternalism,
the mainstream “assumes they have the right and
obligation to assimilate (help) those at the margin, often
without any consultation of the subaltern” [32]. This
reflects a paternalistic ideology in which the mainstream
pursues the “moral duty” of assisting the subaltern,
without however engaging these as an interlocutor in
dialogue and hence, perpetuating the devoicing nature
of their relation [21]. In exemplifying the position of the
subaltern in society, Chatterjee [9] theorises a
dichotomy between what he refers to as civil and
political society: while a civil society of equals is
enabled to establish a dialogue with those in power (“the
state” in Chatterjee’s writing), a political society
encompassing the poor and marginalised is detached
from the state and unable to establish an equal dialogue
with its representatives.
With the intent of narrating stories of devoiced
individuals and communities, two recent studies in
ICT4D have explicitly turned to a subaltern perspective,
to study non-technical rationalities in Ghana’s customs
[1] and the devoicing of tribal communities in Indian
social protection schemes [34]. Furthermore, Lin et al.
[32] – while claiming a postcolonial, rather than
specifically subaltern, perspective for their study –
leverage the notions of mainstream, devoicing,

subalternity and paternalism to examine an ICT4D
project in Taiwan, exposing a narrative of discomfort by
the aboriginal recipients silenced by a mainstream story
of success. Enacting critical theory’s focus on alienation
from the perspective of the oppressed, subaltern studies
offer a lexical apparatus to analyse situations of
perpetuated asymmetrical power, which provides the
basis to consider such an apparatus in the study of digital
workers battling crisis in COVID-19.

4. Methodology
To study the condition of platform workers during
COVID-19, we collected 68 among company
statements, survey reports, press releases and
ethnographic narrations from workers released after the
WHO declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic. Our
source selection followed Avgerou [5] in cautioning
against the pitfalls of vulgar eclecticism and inbreeding.
Vulgar eclecticism is the ad hoc selection of ideas from
a body of literature, while inbreeding is the act of
focusing too narrowly on a set of sources aligning with
one of the parts in the debate. Based on the literature
review conducted above, there were three core
dimensions of representativity to ensure:
- Actor perspectives – a primary read of sources (n =
15), conducted on 28 April 2020, has revealed a
discrepancy of voices between statements released by
the platforms and ethnographies of work during
COVID-19 narrated by the workers. The latter also
include third-party reports based on interviews with
workers, which are primarily revealing of their issues
and uncertainties during the crisis. We have hence split
our source database by collecting an equal number (n =
30) of sources from a platform perspective and from a
workers’ one. Eight more sources, classed as overview
reports and describing the environment without a clear
positional value, have been added to form a more
complete picture of the situation.
- Geography – our literature review of platform work
has revealed systematic differences between global
North and South, on key dimensions such as relative
wages and cruciality of this type of work in generating
livelihoods for workers. For this reason, we have
divided our country-specific sources (46 out of 68) by
location: the split is slightly in favour of countries
classed as low and middle-income by the World Bank,
which constitute 26 of our country-specific sources vs.
20 from high-income countries. The database covers
sources from 18 countries across five continents.
- Type of platform: taxonomies by Heeks [25] and
Graham and Woodcock [18] reveal the importance of
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distinguishing location-specific from online labour
platforms. Both have been affected by COVID-19, but
the literature convenes that location-specific workers
such as ride-hailing, food delivery or domestic service
operators have been hit in more measurable ways, in
terms of both income loss and risk of contracting the
virus while working. For this reason, most sources in our
database (50 vs. 18) pertain to location-specific platform
workers, whereas the remainder are split into onlydigital work (6) and encompassing both digital and
physical (12).
Since COVID-19 has been declared a pandemic on 11
March 2020, this date has been established as cut-off for
our source collection. Our sources have been collected
between this date and 30 June 2020, with a greater
concentration in the second part of the time span due to
source availability growing over time along all the three
dimensions delineated above.

5. Platform Workers and COVID-19: A
Subaltern Theory Analysis
Core concepts from subaltern studies offer a lens to
make sense of the condition of digital platform workers
under COVID-19. Below we illustrate our use of the
conceptual apparatus from a subaltern theoretical
approach, which we apply to our sources database.
5.1. Mainstream Discourse
In examining digital platform work from the
perspective of platform representatives, a common
thread emerges around the position of workers. Beyond
the logic of industry transformation describing the
business model of platforms, a dominant discourse
equates platforms, across different industries, to
generators of job opportunities for unemployed and
vulnerable people. This goes beyond the customercentred transformation of access to core services such as
transport or food delivery, and marks a worker-centred
transformation that affords new flexible, well-paid (or at
least, decently paid) jobs. It is on this vision, combined
with success stories of marginalised people building
livelihoods with platform work [45], that the shared
orthodoxy of “digital platforms for socio-economic
development” has been constructed.
Such a common thread is central to understanding
digital labour platforms’ responses in the wake of
COVID-19. Supported by media reports, platforms’
web communications point to sharing the willingness of
executives to help workers in crisis, taking action
3
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through sets of dedicated measures. Such an intent is
common across digital and physical work platforms,
both of which have expressed firm intentions of
assistance reflected, for example, by Fiverr’s CEO:
We are here to help, and every day we are adding new
resources, donating online courses, and gathering
offers from other companies around the world that
make the lives of businesses and freelancers better at
this challenging time. We also built exclusive
partnerships that help our freelance community, and
we created simple guidance on how to access the US
Government Cares Act Stimulus bill for SMBs and
freelancers.3

This intent is translated into lists of measures taken by
each platform to protect workers, lists that are usually
provided in COVID-19 specific sections of platforms’
websites. For example, Upwork offers a list of measures
described as critical by the platform’s CEO, including
(1) helping self-employed individuals and entrepreneurs
maintain business continuity, (2) supporting freelancers
in a time of need, (3) facilitating earnings from nonUpwork clients, and (4) accelerating receipt of
payments.4 Among other actions the list remarks the
platform’s role as Founding Partner of the Freelancers
Relief Fund, established by the Freelancers’ Union to
assist workers induced into financial hardship by
COVID-19. All these measures, sometimes detailed in
open letters from executives, signal the platforms’
declared intention to actively care for workers in crisis.
When it comes to location-specific platforms, the
situation is made more complex by the drastic, direct
impact of the crisis on workers’ conditions. Locationspecific workers face, as noted above, a difficult
dichotomy: some of them, such as cleaners or providers
of handyman-type services, have seen their job
opportunities drastically reduced or suspended by
lockdown measures. Others, such as ride-hailing app
drivers or food delivery couriers, found themselves on
the frontline of the pandemic, with key workers roles
that some countries officially recognised (as the UK
government and multiple Indian states did for food
delivery operators). On a general rule, these workers are
left with the option to continue to work, with platforms
establishing new conditions in harmony with local
government regulations.
For location-specific workers too, platforms have
taken it to web communication to explicate the ways
they will enact their intent to protect workers. As noted
by the survey from the Fairwork Foundation [14]
mentioned above, the large majority of the 191
platforms surveyed have declared taking dedicated
4
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measures to help workers, ranging from financial
assistance to subsidising protective equipment and, in
some cases, health insurance [14]. Paradigmatically,
Uber UK’s web page on “COVID-19: Your Questions
Answered” details a list of measures in a Q&A form,
which can be invoked by currently active drivers and
include the following:5

crisis – portraying platforms as job creators for the
vulnerable and marginalised. A dominant discourse,
resonating across types of platform and geographical
locations, invests platforms of a protective role that is
strengthened and highlighted during COVID-19.

- Making drivers aware of possible eligibility for the UK
Government’s Self-Employment Income Support
Scheme (SEISS), followed by a list of eligibility
requirements,

While platforms invest themselves with a publicly
declared protective role, a different story – one of
perpetuated gaps of power and information – is narrated
across the worker-centred sources examined here. It
should be noted, in the first place, that relief measures
vary considerably across platforms and countries, and so
do the social welfare policies that platform workers can
access. But in spite of such variations, a common thread
of lacking protection and information emerges across
workers’ reports, a thread that articulates around the
concepts of abandonment, risk and disempowerment
suffered during COVID-19. We review such themes
based on the workers’ ethnographies and third-party
reports collected across different nations.

- Making drivers aware of possible eligibility for
Universal Credit, as well as the possibility to get advice
(from an external party) for those who are “struggling to
pay their bills” due to coronavirus,
- Offer a financial assistance policy (£100 per week for
up to 14 days) to drivers who either (a) have been
diagnosed with COVID-19, (b) have been told to selfisolate by a licensed medical provider or public health
authorities, or (c) have NHS 111 self-serve certification,
- Vehicle providers offering temporary reduction on
weekly payments for rentals, to be reviewed on a caseby-case basis, and working with selected insurance
providers to “ask that they find options” to reduce
drivers’ costs for vehicle insurance,
- Reimbursement (up to £25) on purchases of personal
protective equipment,
- Protection of Uber Pro status for drivers that hold it,
even in the absence of the regular rides that are normally
needed to maintain such a status.
The list, accompanied on the web page by a video from
the head of Uber UK’s Driver Operations team, ends
with the provision of the phone number and website of
a registered charity, to be contacted “if you feel like
circumstances related to coronavirus are impacting your
mental health”. While country-specific in its provisions
and phrasing, such a list exemplifies how a leading actor
in the platform economy is handling communication on
protective measures for workers during the crisis.
All these measures, varying by type of platform but
grouped by a common protective intent, feed into a
shared narrative of platforms’ declared goal to protect
workers’ well-being and financial survival. Clear in its
protection focus, this narrative lies in continuity with
assertions – made by the platforms since well before the

5.2. Devoicing

Abandonment: pervading workers’ reports is, in the
first place, the sense of “being left alone” [4] by
platform representatives, a narrative that stands in stark
contrast with the intent of protection expressed by the
platforms. The theme of abandonment takes two shapes:
first, lack of crucial information to the worker is
reported across countries, with multiple instances [14]
in which workers have learned about COVID-19
protective measures from the media rather than their
employer. Reports from Brazil, India and South Africa
[4, 20, 23] also reveal information on customer
protection being more detailed and accessible than
information on worker protection, a gap also identified
in terms of protective measures (food delivery couriers
in India, for example, enact contact-free delivery, but
not contact-free collection, which perpetuates risk of
exposure).
Secondly, the lack of protective systems perceived
as effective further contributes to a narrative of
abandonment. A common thread across workers’
reports concerns loss of income, estimated by the
Fairwork Foundation [14] at an average of two-thirds of
pre-crisis income. The informal nature of most platform
work – resulting in workers living off a daily wage –
makes this aspect particularly difficult for workers: and
yet, financial assistance policies (where present) are
reported to be systematically challenging to access and,
where accessible, limited in the amounts allowed. In
Brazil, where reimbursement of Uber drivers for PPE is

5
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limited to 20 BRL (ca. 3.5 Euro), financial assistance is
based on the drivers’ performance over the three months
before request [20], and request for it automatically
results in suspension of the drivers’ account, before
notification of the outcome. Such uncertainties,
grouping together workers’ narratives from across our
database, cast a shade of doubt on the mainstream
discourse of protection narrated by platforms.
Risk: a second narrative revolves around workers’
perception of risks endured at the time of crisis. Some
risk components are directly visible: among these are
risks of a financial nature, since financial assistance –
even when obtained, in spite of strict requirements – is
reported to be too limited to offset workers’ equipment
cost, as reported in South Africa [4]. Other risk
components are, instead, less visible: self-ethnographies
[23] and surveys [30] of food delivery couriers in India
report drivers being exposed to infection having to stand
in crowded queues, made more crowded by the limited
opening hours of restaurants during lockdown. In
addition, selected platforms in India pay workers a
minimum daily wage if they complete a certain number
of orders within a given number of hours, leading to
drivers taking longer trips which heighten the trafficrelated risks they normally endure. Perception of risk –
a theme that pervaded pre-crisis reports as well – is
heightened during the crisis, putting workers in front of
the dilemma, resonating across countries, between
giving up work – protecting health risk for workers and
their families – and continuing to work, exposing
themselves to the virus by daily work operations [14].
Disempowerment: a third thread of connection
among workers’ views, emerging in continuity with precrisis gaps in power and information, refers to the
perception of disempowerment towards the effects of
the crisis. Reports reveal a twofold origin of
disempowerment: first, lacking recognition of workers’
position as employees – noted above as a source of
precarity – results in lack of exactly those forms of
health insurance, sick leave and protection that pertain
to formal employment, whose relevance to workers’
lives spiked with COVID-19. Secondly, the abovementioned issue of information asymmetries [26] is
perpetuated during the pandemic, with the issue of
“whom to” speak to magnified by the observed
platforms’ trend to place responsibility on governments
for social welfare, and on workers for respect of
protection norms [25]. Viewed in this light, platforms’
mainstream discourse of protection is balanced against
inability of workers to access core protection systems,
or indeed leverage unionisation to obtain prompt help
under tight crisis conditions.

Shared across national contexts, and notwithstanding
important exceptions that we review below, themes of
abandonment, risk and disempowerment group together
workers’ narratives collected under COVID-19. In
Guha and Spivak’s [21] theorisation of subalternity, the
act of devoicing is constitutive of the subaltern
condition, confining the subaltern as a result of diversity
from the hegemonic discourse that prevails. Placed
against a discourse centred on protection and care for
the worker, a narrative of systematic lack of protection
and care emerges from the workers’ discourse, creating
a counternarrative that, while visible on dedicated
spaces, is silenced and devoiced in the platforms’
discourse.
5.3. Paternalism
Across the platforms reviewed, a further common
point lies in the apparent assumption of “knowing what
the workers need” which mirrors the traits of
paternalistic discourse in subaltern theory. In their
descriptions of responses to COVID-19, multiple
platforms report being in constant contact with workers,
and to be active listeners in devising measures to protect
them. Yet, a review of the worker-centred sources in our
database reveals systematic gaps between these
measures and actions that would be important for
workers. Three core points reveal how platforms are
indeed taking response measures, but quite different
from those required by workers in the current crisis
situation:
- Workers’ voices, as noted by the Fairwork Foundation
[14], are uniform in stating that the main issue is the loss
of income resulting from the pandemic. But among the
platforms they surveyed, only few have adopted direct
policies to increase pay for those in work. Importantly,
platforms that offer financial assistance most often do so
as a substitute for it, not a completion: as ethnographies
reveal, it is exactly this point that leads many ridehailing drivers to refrain from requesting assistance, a
request which – if denied – would deprive them of
subsidy and work earnings altogether [20]. At the same
time, platforms are shown to be taking action to expand
their businesses, reducing client fees or expanding their
services [14]: in India, some platforms have expanded
to include delivery of groceries and vegetables, with the
workers however reporting this has not lead to increases
in orders for them [30].
- Workers’ voices are similarly uniform in stating the
need for sick pay or health insurance, especially workers
of platforms whose activity exposes them to the risk of
COVID-19 infection. Yet, while numerous platforms
have offered or subsidised some protective equipment,
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the forms of health insurance that workers require are
still an extremely rare occurrence. A study of South
Africa [15] has revealed that only three out of 13
surveyed platforms offer some form of healthcare
assistance, with multiple platforms failing to adapt the
provision of health insurance in the light of the current
emergency. For workers still operating, this means
going to work knowing they will not be compensated in
case they get sick, a risk suffered with particular anxiety
by workers whose income is the only one in their
household [20].
- In the critical situation arising from COVID-19,
diverse forms of workers’ collective action across the
world have revealed the importance of representation
for workers to establish communication with employers.
But among platforms, whose representatives write open
letters to workers as well as shareholders and clients, the
Fairwork Foundation survey has found no evidence of
engagement with worker associations, neither with the
strikes and petitions that have emerged in several parts
of the world [14]. Workers’ reports reveal that the
importance of representation has grown in the current
circumstances: and yet, little or no response emerges
from the platform side, adding to the issue of
asymmetrical information that limits opportunities for
building solidarity networks. In light of the importance
of representativity especially during emergency,
findings on its absence further problematise the position
of workers, who often find themselves with subsidised
PPE but without the possibility to effectively
communicate their needs.
In Guha and Spivak’s [21] vision of subalternity, the
mainstream builds for itself the role to “care for” those
at the margin, without however consulting them or
treating them as equals [32]. Assisting the subaltern is
constructed as a moral duty, which is however
accomplished without engaging them into dialogue, as
it would be with Chatterjee’s “civil society” [9].
Overall, the platforms reviewed here manifest an intent
to care for the workers, but deciding – by themselves –
what is important, without engaging any meaningful
dialogue with them. Lack of representation, which was
already rare across the platforms and is starkingly
missing during COVID-19, exemplifies an attitude that
sees the worker as recipient of protective measures, but
not an as an active part to consult in their formulation.

6. Discussion and Conclusions
Subalternity theory offers a conceptual apparatus to
narrate marginalisation of individuals and communities,
making sense of devoicing practices and visualising
their structural underpinnings. While it finds limited

space in IS research so far, the theory presents important
affordances to understand the structures of subalternity,
and differentiates from Western critical theories [33] for
its specific focus on such structures. Our analysis in this
paper shows how subalternity theory supports
understanding of the structural vulnerability of digital
platform workers, reinforced from the COVID-19 crisis
which resulted in greater visibility of extant power and
informational asymmetries in digital work.
Our analysis illuminates the creation of mainstream
discourse from platform representatives, which however
translates into bland paternalism rather than meaningful
dialogue with workers. In parallel, we have elicited a
silenced workers’ narrative which reveals dimensions of
abandonment, risk and disempowerment that dominant
narratives do not explore, but that resonates with recent
research on the institutional voids [24, 33] perpetuated
by digital labour. Concepts of mainstream discourse,
devoicing and paternalism allowed us to illuminate key
aspects of workers’ condition, revealing blind spots [1]
that the subalternity theory allows to conceptualise. The
mainstream discourse is powerful and pervasive [32],
but the conceptual apparatus of subalternity theory
allows sighting and narration of otherwise silenced
dynamics of devoicing and subordination.
Importantly, not all platforms adhere to the
problematic pattern identified above. The Fairwork
Foundation [14] presents a set of examples of best
practices from platforms during COVID-19, such as the
South African domestic work platform SweepSouth
which has created a readily accessible workers’ fund
paid by clients and investors [15]. Other platforms have
instituted forms of health assistance and informed
workers of these at the beginning of the crisis. Such
positive practices are however inscribed in a picture of
prevailing inaction [14]: placed against the dominant
protection discourse, this inaction constitutes the heart
of the problem, especially if seen in relation with the
established vulnerabilities that the crisis has brought to
light.
This study has two main orders of implications. For
the literature on digital labour, the study offers a core
theory to understand vulnerabilities that, as it has been
noted [20; 25] have been made visible by COVID-19,
but are ingrained in conditions that became crystallised
well before the emergency. The recency of the crisis
implies the need of a conceptual system to make sense
of it, which the lexicon of subalternity theory provides.
As future research is conducted on the medium- and
long-term consequences of the crisis, the theory offers
the concepts to develop analyses centred on the critical
condition of workers and its underlying causes.
Secondly, our analysis yields implications for the
study of emerging networks among workers subjected
to the devoicing practices examined here. Recent works
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in social movement studies [6] observed that a datafied
society implies new forms of organisation, which make
representation possible across boundaries as shown, for
example, by recent gig worker strikes in Latin America
[28]. As critical research combines theorisation with
transformation of extant situations, subalternity theory
offers a means to build awareness of devoicing,
generating important conditions for creation of such
solidarity networks.
This paper makes a study of secondary sources,
which offers a clear means to map a situation that is
affecting labour markets on a global scale. But while
solid as a mapping instrument, secondary research does
not afford the possibility of voice-giving provided
especially by primary research with affected workers.
While the self-ethnographies of workers reviewed here
have partially filled that gap, future work requires
primary sources to delve into how subalternity operates
and the shapes it takes under the current crisis. In a
tradition of digital labour literature that places workers
at the centre of analysis, future studies are to be centred
on workers’ direct experience of COVID-19, translating
into reality the transformative intent that underpins
critical research.
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